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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the historical development of the relationship between the Putin 
regime in Russia and the Chávez and Maduro regimes in Venezuela. Key differences and 
similarities in their foreign and domestic policies are explored, as well as how they interact with 
each other on the world stage. It makes the case that ​chavismo​ in Venezuela has lead to 
increasingly autocratic policies as oil prices have declined and leadership has changed hands, 
changing the character of Venezuela and Russia’s relationship into one that closely resembles the 
patron-client relationships of Latin American ​caudillismo​.  
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I. INTRODUCING THE REGIMES
When Hugo Chávez became President of Venezuela in 1999, he declared his victory to 
be the beginning of a Bolivarian revolution. In doing so he invoked Simón Bolívar, a 19th 
century Venezuelan general who had defeated the forces of the Spanish Empire and for a time 
ruled a vast South American confederation encompassing Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and 
Venezuela. Despite Bolívar’s charismatic leadership, the confederation of Gran Colombia 
collapsed and formed five different nations. Before his death, Bolívar placed the blame for his 
failure squarely on the shoulders of ​caudillismo​, a form of government dominated by mutually 
beneficial but inherently unequal patron-client relationships that confounded attempts at South 
American unification. ​Caudillismo ​gets its name from the ​caudillos​ (military strongmen) that 
created these patron-client relationships between themselves and local leaders. Ironically, in 
2015, almost two decades after Chávez declared himself Bolívar’s heir, Chávez’s appointed 
successor Nicolás Maduro would lead Venezuela into a patron-client relationship with one of the 
21​st ​ century’s most dangerous ​caudillos​: Russian President Vladimir Putin. 
The Putin and Chávez regimes were initially drawn together as allies through shared 
geopolitical interests and ideological opposition to the United States. Chavismo (the style of 
government employed by Chávez and his followers) was uniquely well suited for an alliance 
with the Putin regime. This relationship changed radically in 2014 when Venezuela’s leadership 
crisis was compounded with a sharp downturn in oil prices. Unable to recover from either crisis, 
Maduro’s regime now has a patron-client relationship with Vladimir Putin. This mutually 
beneficial, yet inherently unequal, relationship has solidified Putin as Maduro’s most important 
ally and indeed one of his only allies. Russian support is sustaining the Maduro regime, and 
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influencing how Venezuelan governance is shifting toward a more autocratic model. In this 
paper I will explore what Chavismo is, why the chavista system made Venezuela an ideal ally for 
Russia, and what characterizes the new patron-client relationship between the Putin and Maduro 
regimes. 
II. NATURAL ALLIES
Chavismo is a complicated ideology and form of government, but one of its most basic 
principles is aggressive and public opposition to the extension of U.S. influence on the world 
stage. This explicit rejection of a U.S.-dominated global system carried a great deal of risk, but it 
served to ingratiate first the Chávez and then the Maduro regime with President Putin. One of the 
cardinal rules of operating within Putin’s system was that a threat must always originate, “from 
an external or foreign source.”  The chavista regimes have operated much the same way, 
1
perpetually linking the members of the Venezuelan opposition to the U.S. and accusing them of 
not being true Venezuelans, but rather professional protesters being funded by foreign interests 
in order to wage, “economic war”.  This determination to blame the U.S. and its allies for all 
2
internal problems, of course, limited Russia and Venezuela’s options for international 
cooperation. In 2004, in the midst of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, Chávez visited the 
Kremlin and cemented a close alliance with Moscow. After some expertly crafted anti-U.S. 
speeches and denunciations of NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, Chávez had impressed 
Putin enough to conclude several landmark deals. The entire Venezuelan military was converted 
to Russian technology, a massive undertaking and a very profitable one for Putin. Russian energy 
companies were also invited to invest heavily in Venezuela.  
3
1 Maxim Trudolyubov. "A Guide to Getting Along in Putin's Russia." ​The New York Times​, Apr 16, 2018. 
2 ​David Smilde, "The End of Chavismo?" ​Current History​ 114 (769)(2015): 50.  
3Mark N. Katz, "The Putin-Chavez Partnership." ​Problems of Post-Communism​ 53 (4)(2006): 5.  
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While the Chávez and Putin regimes were closely aligned in terms of foreign policy, they 
differed greatly in governing strategies and styles. Where Russian elections were reserved and 
formulaic affairs designed to emphasize stability and continuity, those organized by Chávez were 
bombastic, populist affairs aimed at whipping his political base into a frenzy. Where political 
opposition parties in Russia were tightly controlled in by Putin, the Venezuelan opposition was 
able to oppose Chávez and Maduro openly and loudly and even to win electoral victories. 
Despite this difference, the structure and methods of Chavismo actually contributed to the 
strength of Russia and Venezuela’s current relationship. Chávez’s fourteen years in power laid 
the groundwork for a crisis, forcing the Venezuelan government to choose either serious 
concessions to the opposition or a Putinesque campaign of repression if it was to survive. 
Putin’s domestic policy was calculated to discourage high levels of mass mobilization 
and political action.  In contrast, Chavismo demanded constant mass mobilization for elections 
4
that were given a great deal of fanfare and news coverage. These elections, presented as free and 
fair, were seen as constant referenda on the Chávez presidency.  Large-scale poverty-reducing 
5
social programs sustained by state oil profits were the foundation of Chavismo and that could be 
relied upon to produce an outpouring of enthusiastic support come election day.  These populist 
6
policies were augmented with an extensive state propaganda apparatus that included,  “five 
television channels, dozens of radio stations, electronic networks and websites, and massive 
propaganda on the streets…”  Chávez was a perpetual guest in every Venezuealan home. His 
7
4Allen C. Lynch, "The Influence of Regime Type on Russian Foreign Policy Toward “the West,” 1992–2015." 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies​ 49(2016): 106-107 
5Margarita López Maya. 2014. "Venezuela: The Political Crisis of Post-Chavismo." ​Social Justice​ (4)(2014): 70. 
6Smilde, "The End?", 49.  
7 Maya, “Post-Chavismo”, 70. 
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 message was consistently for them to mobilize in support of his government agenda. Where 
Putin relied on large scale repression of the opposition, Chávez relied on drowning them out. 
Despite differences in electoral strategy, in hindsight the system Chávez built now seems 
designed to fall back on a Putin-style autocracy as soon as the charismatic leadership and/or the 
vast oil wealth of the chavistas faltered. Shortly after his rise to power, in a move reminiscent of 
Putin’s cronyism Russia, Chávez took over most independently organized community councils 
and projects in Venezuela. These groups were integrated into a vast system of state patronage, so 
that even local fundraisers and environmental projects owed their funding and organization to the 
president himself.  At the national level, Chávez took advantage of majorities in the legislature 
8
and friendly members of the judiciary eroded the powers of both branches, making it very 
difficult for them to enact substantial checks on the president’s power.  Chávez also considerably 
9
weakened the opposition media by either buying up unfriendly outlets or simply imprisoning 
opposition journalists, courses of action that would be utilized even more liberally under 
Maduro.  This undermining of the competitive political sphere so deeply entrenched the 
10
chavistas and so intensely alienated the opposition, that any peaceful transfer of power would 
have been extremely difficult to achieve. 
Difficult though a transfer of power would be, Chávez left Maduro with few options. In 
addition to leaving him a government structure that could not easily be converted to genuinely 
competitive politics, Chávez also left him with a brewing crisis that obliterated the widespread 
popularity of Chavismo. Under Chavez the state oil company ​Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A 
(PDVSA) was the key to maintaining popular support. As long as oil profits sustained social 
8 Maya, “Post-Chavismo”, 71. 
9 Maya, “Post Chavismo”, 79. 
10 Freedom House, "Freedom of the Press: Venezuela.", 2015. 
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programs, Chavismo remained ascendent. Yet despite PDVSA’s central position in Chávez’s 
grand strategy, he left it in complete disarray after years of mismanagement. After countering a 
2005 strike with mass layoffs in middle and upper management positions, Chávez never invested 
sufficient resources to train replacement managers.   The state oil company was also saddled 
11
with many other state projects such as food distribution and housing construction. These extra 
responsibilities forced it to put off important repairs and updates that were needed to keep the oil 
projects safe and running at full capacity. Extraction facilities became so overworked and 
inefficient  that PDVSA would often to buy oil on the world market just to fill their customer’s 
orders on time.  Maduro is left unwilling to sacrifice the concentration of power left to him by 
12
Chávez and unable to recover from the 2015 drop in oil prices with PDVSA in shambles.  The 
failure of state programs and the government’s harsh crackdown on protesters left Maduro 
profoundly unpopular, failing to live up to the landslide victories Chávez regularly achieved 
during his lifetime.  
13
Chavismo’s initial success and anti-U.S. politics made a Venezuela-Russia alliance 
initially viable. The failure of Chavismo served to bring them even closer together. Legitimizing 
elections, expansive state programs funded by oil profits, and the appearance of a level political 
playing field were all vital aspects of Chavismo. Those cornerstones crumbled, and Maduro’s 
solution was a campaign of nationwide repression reminiscent of Putin’s consolidation of power. 
A key difference is that Putin’s consolidation occurred when oil prices were going up and the 
national mood was at least somewhat hopeful. Maduro’s increasingly repressive behavior bred 
only resentment and economic uncertainty. Such repression served to further isolate Venezuela 
11 Maya, “Post-Chavismo” 74-75. 
12 Maya, “Post-Chavismo” 74-75. 
13 DatinCorp. 2018​. Cohesión-País Venezuela;​. Caracas, V. 
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on the world stage, dramatically increased civil unrest, and made Putin’s support all the more 
vital to Maduro’s survival. 
III. PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
There is a distinction between the patron-client relationships that typify ​caudillismo​ and 
the concept of “client states.” In the language of Latin American politics, a patron-client 
relationship simply means an alliance that benefits both sides, but with the two clearly not on 
equal footing. The Putin and Maduro regimes are part of an inherently unequal patron-client 
relationship, but this does not make Venezuela a client state. This unequal partnership was not 
the result of threats or domineering policies on the part of Putin. Rather, it was a result of the 
extreme crisis that Venezuela is embroiled in and the resources Putin was willing to expend to 
sustain his ally. 
In the aftermath of Chávez’s death in 2013 and the drop in oil prices in 2014, the far less 
charismatic Maduro has been taking steps to solidify his position. 57% of the population reported 
in 2018 that if given the chance they would flee the country. Maduro could not rely on the old 
populist strategies of Chávez.  As discussed earlier, Putin and Maduro both justified their more 
14
autocratic actions by blaming the imperialistic designs of the United States, subverting them 
from within and following the opposition. Despite the similarity in rhetoric, Maduro watched his 
popularity evaporate while Putin’s position became increasingly secure. In these differing levels 
of danger from the general public we can see one of the key differences between Putin and 
Maduro’s situations, and one of the main reasons their relationship developed as an unequal on. 
14 ​DatinCorp, ​Cohesión-País Venezuela. 
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Putin was far more successful in silencing or co-opting the Russian opposition than Maduro was 
with its Venezuelan equivalent. 
A critical chavista strategy for undermining Venezuela's political opposition has been to 
portray opposition groups as out of touch and elist. When oil prices were high and Chávez made 
regular speeches this was highly effective. When Maduro found himself isolated from the 
populace however, the danger an organized opposition coalition posed to his regime became 
more apparent. Accusing his critics of being agents of Washington was not been sufficient to 
silence their campaigns against the regime. Indeed, many opposition leaders regularly traveled to 
the U.S. to speak out against the Maduro regime and request aid before returning to run for 
office.  Such a strategy is hard to imagine for members of the Russian opposition who do not 
15
want to campaign in exile. Even with all the consolidation of power the chavistas achieved at the 
national level, Maduro is to this day “protested loudly” when he visits the National Assembly to 
support legislation.  The idea of Putin being “protested loudly” in any Russian government 
16
building when “periodic murder” of opposition journalists in Russia is common seems far 
fetched indeed.  The chavista regime could afford to allow for many public freedoms when it 
17
was popular, but the structure of Chavismo ensured that those freedoms could not survive the 
decrease in chavista popularity that would accompany an economic downturn. Putin, on the other 
hand, never needed solely rely on his own popularity to keep his position secure. As long as this 
is true, Maduro will always be playing second fiddle to Putin. 
The benefits of stalwart Russian financial support induced Maduro to accept the position 
of unequal partner. In 2017 alone Maduro’s regime was saved from defaulting on its debt three 
15 ​Smilde, “The End?”, 52. 
16 Maya, “Post-Chavismo”, 79. 
17 Lynch, “Regime Type”. 107. 
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 separate times by last minute Russian loans. Beyond extending critical loans, Putin allowed 
Caracas to put off paying back large Russian loans during times of crisis. Because Venezuela 
pays these loans back in oil reserves, temporary leniency allowed more Venezuelan crude to be 
sold for a profit on the world market.  Krauss observed, ​“Russia is effectively taking China’s 18
place as Venezuela’s principal banker. While President Hugo Chávez was in power, China lent 
Venezuela tens of billions of dollars for projects to be paid for with oil. But China quietly 
stopped making new loans [after 2015], leaving Russia to fill the void.”  The benefits to each 
19
side are clear. Putin expects that once Maduro’s regime stabilizes he will have access to 
extensive Venezuelan oil reserves that he has now essentially purchased at a bargain price. For 
his part, Maduro needs a lenient financial backer if he is going to have any chance of 
consolidating power. 
An additional benefit for Maduro was having the international propaganda apparatus of 
the Russian state, which had already gained some legitimacy among disaffected U.S. Americans, 
mobilized on his behalf. One of the most successful branches of this machinery is Russia Today, 
an English language news network that claims to present a legitimate alternative to U.S. news 
sources. In reality, Russia Today is completely controlled by the Kremlin and organizes its 
reporting around advancing Putin’s political aims.  Evidently, the Kremlin is more than happy 
20
to report Maduro’s propaganda as fact. A popular news segment done in the vein of ​The Daily 
Show​ called ​Redacted Tonight with Lee Camp​ dedicated a segment in 2018 to “Why the U.S. 
wants Venezuela to collapse.” During this time slot one of Chávez’s old advisers, Eva Golinger, 
18 Clifford Krauss,  "Russia Says it Will Ease the Debt Burden on Venezuela." ​The New York Times (Online)​, Nov, 
2017 
19 ​Krauss,  ​"​Rosneft​"​. 
20 Peter Pomerantsev,. 2014. ​Nothing is true and everything is possible : the surreal heart of the new Russia​. n.p.: 
New York : PublicAffairs, [2014], 42. 
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came on the program to decry U.S. subversion of Venezuelan prosperity, defending election 
fraud and violent suppression of protesters through her insistence that the U.S. does the same 
thing and therefore cannot criticize Maduro for protecting himself.  A written article also 
21
produced by Russia Today and also written in English entitled “Can Russia & China Rescue 
Venezuela?” included false information intended to portray Maduro as more secure than he 
actually was at the time of the article. The article claimed that China was working together with 
Russia and against the U.S. to ensure Maduro’s regime does not collapse. According to the 
article, China was too invested in Maduro to allow him to fall, when in fact China refused to 
continue dealing financially with Maduro long before the article was released, as shown earlier 
in this paper.  Given that U.S. sanctions continued to hamper Venezuela’s economic recovery, it 
22
is not hard to imagine why Maduro would want to see Russia Today’s audience take up the cause 
of his government.  
Venezuela also has a wide array of state controlled media outlets. One of 
Maduro’s key mouthpieces has become the newspaper ​El Universal​, which was an opposition 
newspaper until a group of anonymous investors purchased it.  After being acquired by its new 
23
owners, ​El Universal ​became been a staunch friend to Putin. The two incidents that cast a 
shadow over Putin’s 2018 reelection, the tragic fire in a Kemerovo mall  and the poisoning of 
ex-Russian spy Serguéi Skripal, were both reported on by ​El Universal​. The articles could have 
been dictated by the Kremlin’s chief spin artists, portraying Putin as every bit the stable, 
determined, all powerful man he wishes people to see him as. An article about the fire paints 
Putin as an enraged champion of the people descending on Kemerovo demanding an explanation 
21 ​Why the US Wants Venezuela to Collapse. ​Redacted Tonight, Moscow, Russia: Russia Today, 2018. 
22 ​Carlos Garcia Rawlings, "Can Russia & China Rescue Venezuela?" ​Russia Today​, Mar 28, 2018​. 
23 ​Freedom House 2015. "Freedom of the Press: Venezuela." 
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and promising an investigation while local officials quail and beg for forgiveness.  An article on 
24
the poisoning follows a similar formula, giving minimal information on Skripal and instead 
focusing on how calm and ministerial Putin looked when facing down accusations from British 
Prime Minister Theresa May, whom the article portrays as out of control and hysterical.  While 
25
Putin surely appreciated this, it is unlikely that he requested it. Integrated as he now was to the 
chavista ideology, protecting his image was a priority for the Venezuelan state media.  
This illuminates another aspect of the patron-client relationship. It became unequal in 
part because Putin simply had more to offer in some areas. Having an influential 
English-Language news station reporting favorably on Maduro within a country that is aligned 
against him was undeniably a bigger boon than the Venezuelan press agreeing to follow the 
Kremlin line. 
IV. WHERE MADURO IS HEADED
There was a time when Venezuela seemed ascendent and the wealth generated from oil 
made many things seem possible. Chief among them was exporting the Bolivarian revolution 
abroad. This vision of a new multipolar world led Venezuela to be explicitly anti-U.S. while still 
seeking to be accepted as a modern state by the international community. This led to a 
Venezuelan bid for a seat on the UN Security Council and at least nominal concern for being 
seen as protecting human rights.  As has already been seen, a vital part of Chávez’s strategy was 
26
24 ​"Putin Promete Castigo a Culpables Del Trágico Incendio En Un Centro Comercial Siberiano."​El Universal​, Mar 
27, 2018.  
25 "Presidente Ruso Vladimir Putin Mantiene La Calma Ante Acusaciones Sobre El Envenenamiento Del Ex Espía." 
El Universal​, Mar 25, 2018 
26 Ralph S. Clem and Anthony P. Maingot. 2011.​ Venezuela's Petro-Diplomacy : Hugo Chávez's Foreign Policy 
Gainesville : University Press of Florida, 2011, 11-17. 
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 winning what appeared to be free and fair elections consistently. The dream of a global 
Bolivarian revolution required that Venezuela be seen as a stable alternative to U.S. dominance.  
This practice however, has been shown to have been considered luxury by the chavista 
regime. Like many other luxuries, it was discarded as soon as Venezuela's one major export was 
not bringing in funds as it once had. Economic crisis has led Chavismo to fall back on its basic 
structures, which are now revealed to be steeped in tactics of repression and patronage. With 
much of its leverage with the international community slipping away along with its control over 
its own oil, the Maduro regime is less concerned each day with foreign affairs and more with 
how to protect itself at home. 
As discussed above, Maduro has become more authoritarian as his popularity has slipped. 
His tactics have become more violent, including a call to his supporters to arm themselves and 
attack opposition protesters.  Supporting Maduro through all of this is his patron: Vladimir 
27
Putin, who has already invested billions in propping up the regime. 
When we consider the implications of Putin’s growing influence in Venezuela, it should 
not be seen in the context of some sort of domino effect. Venezuela is not Putin’s beachhead in 
Latin America upon which he will build an empire. He did not seek to destabilize Venezuela, but 
rather made an investment that he is willing to see through for geopolitical reasons. To 
understand the situation, it must be examined in an international context free of the regional 
restrictions utilized by many during the Cold War. Maduro and Putin’s relationship makes much 
more sense in this international context. The Maduro regime benefits the Russian president as an 
ideological and economic ally in a geopolitical campaign to lessen U.S. dominance abroad. Putin 
27 ​Smilde, “The End?”, 54.  
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is willing to gamble a great deal of Russian capital to keep a stalwart, anti-U.S. leader afloat, and 
that leader has become demonstrably more autocratic the more reliant he becomes his patron. 
This is a patron he knows will not desert him no matter what sorts of atrocities he might commit 
domestically. By examining the underlying structures and rhetoric of other seemingly stable or 
democratic nations, we can anticipate which would be prime new clients for Venezuela’s new 
caudillo ​should their system fail as well. 
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